ワンダーカジノバカラ

Search this siteSkip to main contentSkip to navigation待兼山セミナー24年度セミナーHome23年度セミナー22年度セミナー過去のセミナーCONTACT待兼山セミナー24年度セミナーHome23年度セミナー22年度セミナー過去のセミナーCONTACTMore24年度セミナーHome23年度セミナー22年度セミナー過去のセミナーCONTACT　大阪大学経済学研究会　 GSE-OSIPP joint seminars in economicsIPP研究会共催NEW■2024年度　第2回　大阪大学経済学研究会　のご案内（IPP研究会共催）■今後のスケジュール■2024年度過去のセミナー第1回　大阪大学経済学研究会　■その他セミナーNEW■2024年度　第2回　大阪大学経済学研究会　のご案内（IPP研究会共催）日時：2024年5月23日（木）13時30分～15時00分　会場: 国際公共政策研究科棟6階会議室　講師：Shurojit Chatterji氏（Singapore Management University）タイトル："Efficiency with Heterogenous forecasts"アブストラクト：Do price forecasts of rational economic agents need to coincide in intertemporal perfectly competitive complete markets in order for markets to allocate resources efficiently? Recent work in a two-period model with a nominal bond has shown that there is a one dimensional set of efficient allocations for generic endowments that can be sustained by heterogenous forecasts. Moreover, these efficient allocations can be supported by forecasts that disagree up to one degree of freedom. Thus, strong as efficiency and perfect competition may appear, they do not imply perfect foresight, but they do add explanatory power to temporary equilibrium, since they select a small subset out of the Pareto efficient allocations, which generally have higher dimension. We next study a muti-period model with a nominal bond that matures in one period and identify the set of efficient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria with heterogenous forecasts. We then add a long maturity bond, which under perfect foresight would be a redundant asset, and show that it fundamentally expands the set of efficient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria. Indeed all wealth transfers compatible with efficiency can arise endogenously. The key feature driving this conclusion are forecasting errors, which lead to ex post arbitrage opportunities that induce these income transfers.＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊Time and Date : Thursday, May 23rd, 2024　Seminar Venue: The Conference Room on the 6th floor of OSIPP in Toyonaka Campus Speaker: Shurojit Chatterji氏（Singapore Management University）Title : "Efficiency with Heterogenous forecasts"Abstract: Do price forecasts of rational economic agents need to coincide in intertemporal perfectly competitive complete markets in order for markets to allocate resources efficiently? Recent work in a two-period model with a nominal bond has shown that there is a one dimensional set of efficient allocations for generic endowments that can be sustained by heterogenous forecasts. Moreover, these efficient allocations can be supported by forecasts that disagree up to one degree of freedom. Thus, strong as efficiency and perfect competition may appear, they do not imply perfect foresight, but they do add explanatory power to temporary equilibrium, since they select a small subset out of the Pareto efficient allocations, which generally have higher dimension. We next study a muti-period model with a nominal bond that matures in one period and identify the set of efficient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria with heterogenous forecasts. We then add a long maturity bond, which under perfect foresight would be a redundant asset, and show that it fundamentally expands the set of efficient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria. Indeed all wealth transfers compatible with efficiency can arise endogenously. The key feature driving this conclusion are forecasting errors, which lead to ex post arbitrage opportunities that induce these income transfers.＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊■今後のスケジュール日時：2024年5月30日（木）13：30～15：00　会場：豊中キャンパス国際公共政策研究科6階会議室講師：小西　秀男氏（Boston College）タイトル：Competing Teams in Large Markets: Free Entry Equilibrium with (Sub-)Optimal Contractsアブストラクト：In this paper, we formalize a market with a large number of competing production teams following Alchian and Demsetz (1974). We allow for wide-spread externalities which can affect players’ payoffs. These externalities include changes in market conditions and pollutions, and may generate a variety of equilibrium outcomes. There are finite types of atomless players, who can form team-firms with finite memberships using available technologies. Given an arbitrary set of feasible partnership contracts for each team type, we consider free entry equilibrium as our equilibrium concept in a free entry equilibrium, no team type can attract its members from other teams by proposing any implementable partnership contract. Furthermore, in a free entry equilibrium, players of the same type may have different payoffs unequal treatment of equals. We show that as long as each firm type’s implementable payoff set is compact and continuous in externality variables, there exists a free entry equilibrium. We provide several applications of our results.＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊日時：2024年6月6日（木）13：30～15：00会場：豊中キャンパス国際公共政策研究科6階会議室講師：Hyunseok Jung氏（University of Arkansas）　タイトル：Testing for Peer Effects without Specifying the Network Structureアブストラクト：This paper proposes an Anderson-Rubin (AR) test for the presence of peer effects in panel data without the need to specify the network structure.The unrestricted model of our test is a linear panel data model of social interactions with dyad-specific peer effects. The proposed AR test evaluates if the peer effect coefficients are all zero. As the number of peer effect coefficients increases with the sample size, so does the number of instrumental variables (IVs) employed to test the restrictions under the null, rendering Bekker’s many-IV environment. By extending existing many-IV asymptotic results to panel data, we establish the asymptotic validity of the proposed AR test. Our Monte Carlo simulations show the robustness and superior performance of the proposed test compared to some existing tests with misspecified networks. We provide two applications to demonstrate its empirical relevance. After the seminar on June 6, I will move to Tokyo (using Shinkansen), where I will give a seminar at the U of Tokyo on June 7. If your department can reimburse the train cost for me, that would be great! For your reference, below items will be reimbursed from the U of Tokyo:＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊日時：2024年6月27日（木）13:30～15：00会場：豊中キャンパス国際公共政策研究科6階会議室講師：佐野　隆司氏（横浜国立大学）タイトル：Beyond Quasilinearity: Exploring Nonlinear Scoring Rules in Procurement Auctions (joint with Makoto Hanazono, Jun Nakabayashi, and Masanori Tsuruoka)アブストラクト：This study examines procurement auctions in which bidders submit price and quality, and they are evaluated using the price-per-quality-ratioscoring rule. We formulate a model of scoring auctions in which bidders’ cost is determined by unidimensional type and unidimensional quality. We characterize the equilibrium bidding behavior for the first-score and second-score auctions. In contrast to the well-known quasilinear scoring rules in which price and quality are additively separable and score is linear in price, the equivalence theorem does not hold between the auction formats. We show that the second-score auction yields a lower (better) expected score than the first-score auction. We provide a set of conditions under which the expected quality and price are higher in the first-score auction than in the second-score auction. We also argue how these results can be extended to other non-quasilinear scoring rules.＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊【マクロ研共催セミナー】日時：2024年7月19日（金）13:30～会場：豊中キャンパス法経講義棟7階　大会議室講師：13:30-15:00 稲垣　一真氏（ロチェスター大学）/　15:20-16:50 保里　俊介氏（一橋大学）＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊日時：2024年７月25日（木）13:30～16：40会場：TBA講師：守屋　隆弘氏（Stony Brook University）土居　直史氏（小樽商科大学）＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊日時：2024年8月1日（木）13：30～15：00（調整中）会場：TBA講師：能勢　学氏（IMF）■2024年度過去のセミナー第1回　大阪大学経済学研究会　日時：2024年4月5日（金）16時50分～18時20分　会場: 国際公共政策研究科棟6階会議室　講師：Asad Islam 氏 (Monash University)タイトル："Forced Displacement, Mental Health, and Child Development: Evidence from the Rohingya Refugees"アブストラクト：Forced displacement is a major driver of mental disorders among refugees worldwide. Poor mental health of adult refugees, particularly mothers, is also considered a risk factor for the psychological well-being and development of their children. In this study, we experimentally examine the extent to which a multifaceted psychosocial program improves the mental health of refugee mothers, and facilitates growth and development among children under the age of two. In partnership with BRAC, we ran a cluster randomized controlled trial on 3,500 Rohingya mother-child dyads in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Participants were given weekly psychosocial support for 44 weeks through peer volunteers, which includes psychoeducation and parenting support for mothers and play activities for both mothers and children. The intervention was largely successful and led to: (i) reductions in the psychological trauma and depression severity of mothers and children, (ii) improvements in communication, gross-motor, and problem-solving skills of children, and (iii) reductions in stunting and severe stunting. The intervention cost about $1 per dyad per week and is currently being scaled up in refugee camps in Bangladesh, where about seventeen thousand mother-child pairs now benefit from it.■その他セミナーセミナー／ワークショップ（ECON、OSIPP、ISER、および大阪大学周辺の他のワークショップ。）Google SitesReport abusePage detailsPage updated Google SitesReport abuse